The threat of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons or material is greater today than ever before. Subnational groups such as al Qaeda and the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult have had both the motivation and the resources to purchase or build nuclear weapons. Similarly, the nuclear weapons inventory and production complex of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere remain a vast potential source of supply. If successful, nuclear-armed terrorists would pose a grave threat to U.S. national security and to the United States' friends and allies.
To develop an effective strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism, the United States needs a thorough understanding of how terrorists have attempted to acquire nuclear capabilities in the past. Fortunately, few groups have made a systematic effort to make, buy, or steal nuclear weapons or materials. Within this relatively small set, three cases stand out as instructive: Aum Shinrikyo's attempt to purchase nuclear weapons from high-level Russian officials in the 1990s, al Qaeda's alleged efforts to purchase nuclear weapons and material from various sources throughout the 1990s, and the 1970s theft of nuclear material from the Kinshasa research reactor in the Congo and attempt to sell it on the illicit market in the 1990s. RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) studied these cases to better understand the supply and demand for nuclear materials and why these attempts failed. Researchers reached two major conclusions:
Al Qaeda Nuclear Program Usa
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Acquiring a nuclear weapon requires access to specialized material and a high level of technical expertise that has historically been beyond the reach of terrorist groups. Throughout the 1990s, Aum Shinrikyo tried without success to hire Russian nuclear experts, to purchase Russian nuclear technology and data, to mine uranium, and to steal sensitive nuclear power plant information. These efforts were thwarted by Russian officials' refusal to cooperate and by the lack of technical expertise within the group. Similarly, al Qaeda has been exposed to numerous scams involving the sale of radiological waste and other non-weapons-grade material. These difficulties may lead terrorists to conclude that nuclear acquisition is too difficult and too expensive to pursue.
Despite the difficulty of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear material, the United States and its friends and allies should take greater steps to control the supply side of the nuclear marketplace. Even with inspections and safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency could not prevent the disappearance of two reactor rods from the Kinshasa research reactor in the Congo in the 1970s. One of these rods appeared on the black market in the 1990s. The other rod may yet wind up in the hands of terrorists, who could extract enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. This case suggests that the United States and the international community should make strengthening the control of nuclear material a high priority in the fight against nuclear terrorism.
In the aftermath of Iraq's defeat, the U.S.-led U.N. coalition was able to compel Iraq to agree to an inspection and monitoring regime, intended to insure that Iraq dismantled its WMD programs and did not take actions to reconstitute them. The means of implementing the relevant U.N. resolutions was the Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM). That inspection regime continued until December 16, 1998 - although it involved interruptions, confrontations, and Iraqi attempts at denial and deception - when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in the face of Iraqi refusal to cooperate, and harassment.
Subsequent to George W. Bush's assumption of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what had become the status quo with respect to Iraq - a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons of mass destruction programs. As part of their campaign against the status quo, which included the clear threat of the eventual use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S. and Britain published documents and provided briefings detailing their conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its attempts to deceive other nations about those programs.
As a result of the U.S. and British campaign, and after prolonged negotiations between the United States, Britain, France, Russia and other U.N. Security Council members, the United Nations declared that Iraq would have to accept even more intrusive inspections than under the previous inspection regime - to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - or face "serious consequences." Iraq agreed to accept the U.N. decision and inspections resumed in late November 2002. On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted its 12,000 page declaration, which claimed that it had no current WMD programs. Intelligence analysts from the United States and other nations immediately began to scrutinize the document, and senior U.S. officials quickly rejected the claims. (Note 2)
By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the date of this publication, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The reliability of sources has been questioned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful deception by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence U.S. policy.
The material presented in this electronic briefing book includes both essential pre-war documentation and documents produced or released subsequent to the start of military action in March 2003. Pre-war documentation includes the major unclassified U.S. and British assessments of Iraq's WMD programs; the IAEA and UNSCOM reports covering the final period prior to their 1998 departure, and between November 27, 2002, and February 2003; the transcript of a key speech by President Bush; a statement of U.S. policy toward combating WMD; the transcript of and slides for Secretary Powell's presentation to the U.N. on February 5, 2003; and documents from the 1980s and 1990's concerning various aspects of Iraqi WMD activities.
On June 7, 1981, in an attempt to prevent Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, before it became operational. This assessment, produced by the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, examines Arab reactions to the attack as well as both the immediate and short-term repercussions of the pre-emptive strike.
Written after the conclusion of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, this CIA survey examined Saddam Hussein's likely regional and international objectives and strategies - including his relations with other Arab states and the PLO, his desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the USSR, and his goal of preventing closer ties between the US and USSR and Iran. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the analysis briefly discusses Iraqi attitudes toward chemical and nuclear weapons. The first are considered a "short-term fix," while the latter represent "the long-term deterrent."
During the Persian Gulf War, Iraq made extensive use of its Scud missile force to attack both Israel and Saudi Arabia - a Scud that hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killed 28 U.S. servicemen. This paper completed a month prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait noted that "Iraq has the most aggressive and advanced ballistic missile development program in the Arab world" and that it already had two modified versions of the Scud B - the Al Husayn and Al Abbas.
The paper examines the origins, development, and results of the Iraqi missile program - in the form of the Scud B and its variants. It also examines warhead options - including chemical, biological, and nuclear. In addition, it discusses Iraq's missile production infrastructure as well as foreign assistance to the missile program.
This study, completed by the CIA's Office of Scientific and Weapons Research after the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War, examined the status of the four components of Iraq's WMD programs -- chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles -- as of January 15, 1991, the day President George H.W. Bush signed National Security Directive 54, authorizing the use of force to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The report asserted that Iraq apparently believed that it needed chemical weapons both as a deterrent and to fulfill its role as "protector" of the Arab world. There were strong indications, according to the report, that Iraq was prepared to use chemical weapons in any conflict with the United States. The author(s) characterized Iraq's biological weapons program as "the most extensive in the Arab world." With respect to nuclear weapons, the report concluded that Iraq probably had the capability, if combined with clandestinely acquired foreign technology, to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1990s. Iraq's ballistic missile program was "the most advanced in the Arab world," the report also concluded.
From 1988 to 1990, Iraq was involved in an unusual weapons program, codenamed Project Babylon. The project's objective was the development and production of several large caliber guns, including a 1,000-millimeter-diameter supergun. In addition, the project included development of both conventional and rocket projectiles for the gun. The gun was intended to deliver the explosive devices to military and economic targets up to 620 miles away. The project was being managed for Iraq by a foreign company, Space Research Corporation, headed by Gerald Bull.
Part of one of the report describes the work done by the IAEA, during the period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997 in montoring and verifying Iraqi compliance with the nuclear disarmament provisions of U.N. resolution 687 (1991). It includes an extensive summary of the technical discussions between IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the report provides an overview of IAEA activities since 1991 related to on-site inspection of Iraqi's nuclear capabilities and the destruction, removal, or neutralization of Iraqi nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons related material or facilities. 2ff7e9595c
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